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Outline
1 Scientific Metaphysics and the Different Versions of Quantum
Mechanics
2 Is the Problem Scientific or Metaphysical?
3 Alleged Reasons to View the Measurement Problem as a
Pseudo-Problem
4 Is a Bohrian Approach to QM Acceptable for the Realist?
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Good and Bad Metaphysics
(2013)
Scientific Metaphysics
“. . . to explore what a metaphysics
looks like that is judged by scientific
standards and that avoids appeals
to intuition” (Kincaid 2013, p. 1)
What are “scientific standards”? A liberal interpretation threatens
to let in too much metaphysics.
But an over-restrictive interpretation creates a tension with the
kind of scientific realism on which the project of scientific
metaphysics is based: science is supposed to give us knowledge
about mind-independent reality beyond the observable
phenomena.
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QM as a Problem for Scientific Metaphysics
Different versions of quantum mechanics (Everett, Bohm, collapse
theories) make radically different claims about reality, and
scientific standards do not give clear preference to any one of
them.
The choice between them thus depends on the kind of intuitions
(e.g., about explanatory power) that scientific metaphysics seeks
to avoid.
Two possible lines of response (cf. Ladyman 2012):
1 The alleged problem of underdetermination will be solved
scientifically in due course.
2 There is no real problem, so opting for one of its “solutions” is an
exercise in idle metaphysics.
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Only a Temporary Problem?
It may indeed become possible to experimentally test collapse
versions of QM against no-collapse versions, but these tests will
not resolve all the differences within those camps.
Consequently, one might hope for progress on the theoretical
front: “empirically equivalent theories may turn out to differ when
they are extended to new domains” (Ladyman 2012, 44).
However, the extension of QM to the relativistic theory of quantum
fields (QFT) does not indicate any alleviation of the problem of
underdetermination.
Applications of QFT (in particular, scattering theory) “solve” the
measurement problem by fiat, simply assuming definite final states.
This makes QFT a highly successful predictive apparatus, but not a
theory about which one could directly be a scientific realist.
There are research programs seeking to extend solutions of the
measurement problem from QM to QFT, but the competition
between them inherits (a modified version of) the old
underdetermination problem.
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The Measurement Problem as a Piece of Unscientific
Metaphysics?
Sociologically, it’s hard to denounce the measurement problem as
unscientific, for at least part of the work on it is performed by
physicists and mathematicians, published in physics journals and
funded by standard institutions of scientific research funding.
True, the majority of physicists does not worry about the
measurement problem, but if metaphysical questions were to be
decided in this way, then instrumentalism about QM should be our
first choice.
Against this, Ladyman and Ross (2007, 2013; henceforth “L&R”)
have argued for a way to dissolve (rather than to solve) the
measurement problem that is supposed to be compatible with
scientific realism.
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What Is (and Is Not) Claimed in the Following
I do not dispute L&R’s dismissal of a simplistic
realism-versus-instrumentalism dichotomy. Admittedly, there is
much within the formalism of QM about which one can be a realist
without being committed to any realistic solution of the
measurement problem.
Nor do I criticize their position for being only a partial realism
(Esfeld 2013). (I endorse a version of partial realism myself; see
Egg 2014.)
Thesis to be defended
L&R’s dissolution of the measurement problem is not supported
by the arguments they draw from naturalized metaphysics or ontic
structural realism (OSR).
Furthermore, it undermines some specific commitments that
should be part of any kind of realism, even the minimal kind that
they themselves defend.
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Traditional Formulation of the Measurement Problem
Standard example
Basis states of the measured quantum system: |0〉S and |1〉S.
Possible final states of the measurement apparatus: |“0”〉A and
|“1”〉A.
Problem: the state a|0〉S|“0”〉A + b|1〉S|“1”〉A does not seem to
describe anything we observe, if a and b are both nonzero.
Why should we assign quantum states to the measurement
apparatus? The usual rationale is that it is supposed to be
composed of a large number of quantum particles.
L&R reject this supposition. Their ontic structural realism (OSR)
entails a “hostility to the idea that macroscopic objects are
fundamentally made of microscopic ones” (2007, 182).
But do the arguments for OSR really undermine the formulation of
the measurement problem?
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L&R’s Objections to the Measurement Problem
Objection 1: against philosophical accounts of composition
L&R criticize traditional accounts of composition for not paying
sufficient attention to how composition is treated in the various
sciences: “We have no reason to believe that an abstract composition
relation is anything other than an entrenched philosophical fetish”
(2007, 21)
Reply
The formulation of the measurement problem does not depend on
such an abstract composition relation.
Instead, the rules of composition within QM itself tell us that the
compound systems can be in superposed states just as the
elementary systems can.
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Objection 2: Doubts about fundamental objects
The historically most important arguments for OSR come from the the
indistinguishability postulate in quantum statistics and the
non-supervenience of entanglement relations. The ensuing questions
about the identity and individuality of quantum particles suggest that
there are no objects at the fundamental level.
Reply
Yes, particles are not fundamental and they may not be individuals, but
this is irrelevant to formulating the measurement problem.
The QM of composite systems is insensitive to whether the
components are regarded as individuals or not; only cardinality
matters.
Various non-fundamental systems (atoms, molecules,
fullerenes,. . . ) have been shown to come in superposed states,
and nothing more is required to formulate the measurement
problem.
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Objection 3: no particles in quantum field theory
Even the cardinality of particles becomes unstable in quantum field
theory. Particles are no longer persistent objects, but mere excitations
of quantum fields. It makes no sense to say that larger objects are
“made of” such entities.
Reply
In spite of this, particles exist in the sense of being real patterns,
identifiable at an appropriate time and energy scale (rainforest
realism; L&R 2007, Ch. 4)
It is at this scale that the measurement problem is formulated.
Quantum field theory is irrelevant to it.
(Aside: the converse does not hold – one needs to address the
measurement problem to make sense of quantum field theory.)
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Objection 4: lack of empirical justification
“The application of the quantum formalism to macroscopic objects is not necessarily
justified, especially if those objects are importantly different from microscopic objects,
as indeed they are, in not being carefully isolated from the environment. [From a
naturalistic viewpoint], the representation of macroscopic objects using quantum
states can only be justified on the basis of its explanatory and predictive power and it
has neither.” (L&R 2007, 182)
Reply
Although there is indeed no direct empirical justification for
assigning quantum states to macroscopic objects, there is
overwhelming indirect (scientific, not just philosophical!)
justification for it.
Decoherence theory, an explanatorily and predictively powerful
part of QM routinely assigns quantum states to macroscopic
objects (the environment).
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L&R’s Positive (Bohrian) Proposal
“The predictive success of QM in this context [of measurement]
consists in the successful application of the Born rule, and that is
bought at the cost of a pragmatic splitting of the world into system and
apparatus.” (L&R 2007, 182)
The application of the Born rule is indeed successful if we insist
(with Bohr) that the apparatus needs to be described classically in
the sense of not being in any superposed state.
L&R (2013, 134) explicitly sympathize with Bohr’s early version of
the Copenhagen interpretation, which differs from later versions
by refusing to give any story about collapse of the wave function.
The question now is whether this is compatible with realism.
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The Problem with “Measurement”
The Born rule (technically simplified formulation)
Let a quantum system be in state |ψ〉 = c1|ε1〉 + c2|ε2〉 + . . ., where the
|ε1〉, |ε2〉, . . . correspond to the possible outcomes of a certain
measurement. Then such a measurement yields the result
corresponding to |εi〉 with probability |ci|2.
The problem with the reference to probabilities of measurement
results is that it is notoriously unclear what counts as a
“measurement” (Bell 1990).
Such an imprecise notion should not occur in a basic assumption
of physics. This is why realistic versions of QM (e.g., Everett,
Bohm, GRW) seek to derive the Born rule by giving a physical
account of what it is to be a measurement.
Bohr, on the other hand, denies the need for such an account, as
L&R (2013, 134) point out approvingly.
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“Measurement” without Analysis
Admittedly, any theory has to operate with some basic notions
which are not amenable to further analysis, so why not simply
treat “measurement” as such a notion?
This works well for situations in which we all agree whether the
notion applies or not. But what about ambiguous cases, for
example, a device that displays a measurement outcome which is
not (even indirectly) observed by anyone? (“indirect observation”
in the sense of “informational connectedness”, L&R 2007, 307)
If one insists that the Born rule does also apply to such cases, one
implicitly accepts spontaneous collapses (i.e., one of the solutions
to the measurement problem that L&R sought to avoid).
If it doesn’t apply, this means that the presence of an observer
makes a difference to the physical process, whereas naturalistically,
an observer should be viewed as just another measuring device.
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Verificationism vs. Realism
One could deny that there are any facts of the matter concerning
unobserved measurements, because such events (by definition)
do not make any difference to what we observe.
This is hard to square with realism, understood as a stance that
refuses to limit reality to what we can observe (or worse still, to
what we actually do observe).
L&R are quite honest about how their verificationism limits the
domain of what counts as real, but they only discuss an example
with which most realists will readily agree: “there are no grounds
for regarding the other side of [the Big Bang] as part of reality”
(2007, 309).
By contrast, many realists will think that something has gone
deeply wrong if there is no longer a fact of the matter as to how
our measurement devices behave when no one watches them.
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L&R’s Realism about Unobserved Data
Since L&R do not endorse standard realism anyway, could they not
simply accept antirealism about unobserved measurements and still
hold on to their brand of realism?
Probably not. First hint:
In their discussion of real patterns, they acknowledge that “there
are (presumably) real patterns in lifeless parts of the universe that
no actual observer will ever reach” (2007, 203).
Since patterns are “relations among data” (228), such realism
about patterns presupposes realism about data regardless of
whether they are observed or not.
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A Closer Look at L&R’s Realism: Objective Modality
L&R (2007, Subsection 2.3.2) defend a commitment to objective
modality as a crucial element of realism against van Fraassen’s
constructive empiricism.
According to L&R, constructive empiricism’s refusal to regard
beliefs about non-actual states of affairs as justified neglects the
fact that we can to some extent vary what becomes actual and still
experience that our theories accurately predict what we observe.
Theories are always modalized in the sense that they allow for a variety of
different initial conditions or background assumptions rather than just the
actual ones, and so describe counterfactual states of affairs. (2007, 110)
Therefore, the empiricist relies on a somewhat arbitrary boundary
when confining the content of our theories to a description of what
actually occurs.
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Arbitrariness of the Modalized Born Rule
If the Born rule is modalized in the above sense, it does give us
knowledge not only about what actually occurs, but also about
what would occur under different conditions. In that sense, L&R’s
approach to the measurement problem does not fall prey to their
charge of arbitrariness against constructive empiricism.
However, the approach invokes a boundary that is just as
arbitrary, namely between what is observed and what actually
occurs without being observed. The Born rule is silent about the
latter set of events.
It seems that both kinds of arbitrariness ought to be equally
unacceptable to L&R. But then, they should reject their own
approach to the measurement problem in the same way as they
reject constructive empiricism.
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Conclusion
Ladyman’s defense of scientific metaphysics depends on
distinghishing between
1 scientifically serious cases of underdetermination (which can be
expected to be solved in due course), and
2 purely metaphysical cases of underdetermination (which aren’t
worth worrying about).
The case of underdetermination between different versions of QM
does not seem to fit into either of these categories.
In the context of this important example, scientific metaphysics
either has to revert to the use of intuitions or it collapses into
instrumentalism.
Other recent attempts to avoid the dilemma between
instrumentalism and too much metaphysics (Healey’s pragmatist
quantum realism, Bub’s information theoretic realism) seem to
face the same problem.
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